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An estimation of the extent of an insurgency appears to be a
prerequisite for determining effective counterinsurgency policies.
A method is developed to estimate a confidence interval for present
insurgent strength based on consumption of a selected commodity.
By examining the anticipated effects of dynamic counterinsurgency
programs on additions and deletions to insurgent strength, estimates
of future insurgent strength can be attempted. For this purpose,
recursive relationships are developed describing changes in insur-
gent strength which occur with changes in level of a single govern-
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The presence of insurgents is a problem with which many
governments have had to or will have to contend. Since insurgent
activity usually represents a political and/or military expression of
dissatisfaction with the governmental structure, governments should
want to eliminate this activity quickly and completely. An estimation
of the extent of the insurgency and in particular the number of insur-
gents seems to be one of the first steps toward dealing with insurgents.
Without some knowledge of insurgent strength, a government appears
to be lacking essential information for determining effective counter-
insurgency policies.
In the past, insurgent strength has been estimated with varying
degrees of accuracy on the basis of government police or troop observ-
ations, statements of surrendered or captured insurgents, and insurgent
documents which have been discovered or seized. Two specific
examples of insurgency were investigated to discover any references
to estimated strength. In the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), govern-
ment intelligence estimates indicated 12 regiments of insurgents.
These were regiments in name only and the strength and organization
of the regiments bore no relation to accepted standards. No specific
Walker, P. B. G. , Notes on the Malayan Emergency: Strategies
and Organization of the Opposing Forces
, p. 11, Stanford
Research Institute, 1967.
estimates of the number of insurgents were given. In the current insur-
gency in Southern Thailand, insurgent strength is estimated to be
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between 500 and 700. In the literature concerning both insurgent
situations, no reference is made to analytical techniques as a method
of estimating insurgent strength.
It is the purpose of this thesis to suggest analytical methods
which a government might use to estimate the present and future number
of insurgents. In order to proceed logically with this thesis, estimation
of present and future insurgent strength will be considered separately.
The method to be suggested for estimating present insurgent
strength is based upon consumption of a commodity which is an integral
part of the local diet of the area being considered. An examination of
the relationship of the consumption of this commodity and the size of
the population consuming it should reveal linearity, and knowledge of
commodity consumption should provide an estimate of population in the
area under consideration. After a commodity consumption variable is
decided upon, a confidence interval can be established for the populatior
from a suspected insurgent village. Comparison of the known population
with the interval of estimated population, for a particular confidence
level, can yield a range of values for the number of insurgents present
at the same confidence level. In order for this result to occur, the
2
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known population has to be outside the interval of estimated population,
When the known population is in the interval of estimated population,
no statement can be made about the presence of insurgents.
There will be two methods suggested for predicting the value of
insurgent strength in future time periods . One method of prediction
uses past data for the construction of graphs of the various additions
and deletions to present insurgent strength, as functions of one govern-
ment activity. Using these graphs and an estimated level of a parti-
cular government activity, future insurgent strength can be predicted.
An alternate method for estimating future insurgent strength considers




II. MODEL FOR ESTIMATION OF PRESENT INSURGENT STRENGTH
Since insurgents have to eat to survive and their diet is probably-
similar to the diet of local non-insurgents, it seemed reasonable to
attempt to estimate the present number of insurgents by measuring the
amount of a particular food that they consumed. The first determination
to be made is the food commodity to be measured. It should be an item
which is a necessity for the insurgents either for health purposes or
for morale purposes. Depending on the geographical location of the
analysis, some possible commodities might be rice, citrus fruit, fish,
bread, vegetables and various kinds of meat.
The selected commodity should be one which is consumed by a
large proportion of the non-insurgent population and can be purchased
by non-insurgents of all income groups. The wholesale sales data for
the selected commodity should be used to expedite compilation and to
avoid unnecessary possibilities of error. Population data should come
from the most recent census
.
The estimation of a confidence range of population for non-
insurgent villages is predicated upon the assumption that a linear
relationship exists between population and commodity consumed.
Similarly, suspected insurgent villages are assumed to have linear
relationships between population and commodity consumption. If a
linear relationship exists between population and commodity consumed,
then this relationship can be expressed by an estimated regression
equation
12







Y = A -f b (x - x), (1)
where Y is the predicted non-insurgent village commodity consumption,
x is the known population of a non-insurgent village from the census,
and x is the mean of the census observations . After differentiating










where y is the observed non-insurgent village commodity consumption,
2 2
k is the number of villages, and S is an estimator of a , the variance
, 3
of y.
The quantity e represents the population of a village estimated
on the basis of consumption of a selected commodity. The known popula
of a suspected insurgent village from the census is x'. A confidence
interval for the difference between e and x' is desired. In the
3
A full development of the regression method is presented in
Appendix A.
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process of presenting expressions for e, and e„, which are the
endpoints of the confidence interval for e, a quantity W is defined
aS






is a value from the " student -t" tables. If W has a value
less than one-tenth, the expressions for e, and e are
x + v'-a hi I n + h, (v'-a) (7)
and
11
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the known population of a suspected insurgent village
from the census, is not in the confidence interval ( e. , e ), then
( e -x' , e -x' ) represents the confidence interval for the number of
people not counted in the census of the suspected insurgent village.
Usually insurgents operate from remote bases located in the jungle or
rural areas and it is assumed that insurgents are not counted in the
census. If the census was accurate , then ( e..-x', e -x' ) represents
a confidence interval for the number of insurgents in the proximity of
the suspected insurgent village. If x' is in the confidence interval
( e , e ) , no statement can be made about the number of insurgents
near the suspected insurgent village.
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A. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, the applicability of the model is demonstrated
through numerical examples using hypothetical data. The assumed
scenario is Southeast Asia and the commodity is rice. Rice was selected
as the commodity since it exists in the local and insurgent diets. It is
assumed that rice is consumed by both insurgents and non-insurgents
in approximately equal amounts of one pound per person per day.
For the first example, Table I shows the population and rice
consumption figure for four fictitious villages where insurgents are
Table I
Population and Rice Consumption of Four Villages
2 2




Village A 500 178 250,000 31,684 89,000
Village B 1,200 448 1,440,000 200,704 537,600
Village C 700 260 490,000 67,600 182,000
Village D 1,100 397 1,210,000 157,609 436,700
Total 3,500 1,283 3,500,000 457,597 1,245,300
2 2
assumed not to be present. The village and total values of x , y , and
xy, which are needed to apply the model presented in the beginning of
this chapter, are also given in Table I.
15





E(x. -x) = Ex. - —r^- = 327,500,
1 IK
-2 2 (EY i )
E (y.-y) = Ey. - —7—- = 46,075,
and
ex. Ey.
E (x.-x) (y.-y) = Ex.y. - f: L = 122,675.
l l ilk





A = -r-L = 321,

















= 4 ° 303
for two degrees of freedom. Using equation (6),
v!W = — = .024 .
b E (x-x) Z
Suppose the population of a suspected insurgent village (x 1 ) was
1300 (from census data) and the annual rice consumption (y 1 ) was
510,000 pounds. Since W < 0.1, approximations (7) and (8) can be
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used and they yield e = 1508 and e = 1252. Since x' = 1300
is inside the 95% confidence interval for e
,
(1252, 1508), no state-
ment can be made about the presence of insurgents in the suspected
insurgent village. Similarly, for y' = 510,000, 90% confidence limits
on e yield the interval (1293, 1467) and no statement can be made about
the presence of insurgents in the suspected insurgent village.
In the second example, the number of fictitious villages where
insurgents are assumed not be present is increased to ten. It is hoped
that the additional data from these villages may provide a smaller 95%
confidence interval for e and lead to a conclusive statement concerning
the number of insurgents in the suspected insurgent village.
Table II shows the population and rice consumption figures for
ten fictitious villages where insurgents are assumed not to be present.
2 2
The village and total values of x , y , and xy, which are needed to
apply the model presented in the beginning of this chapter, are also
given in Table II.
Hence k = 10, x = 1,020, y = 373,
Z (x. -x) 2 = 1,667,800,
Z (Y
i
-y) 2 = 222,628,
and
Z (x. -x) (y. -y) = 609,020.
2
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Population and Rice Consumption of Ten Villages
? 2




Village A 500 178 250,000 31,684 89,000
Village B 1,200 448 1,440,000 200,704 537,600
Village C 700 260 490,000 67,600 182,000
Village D 1,100 397 1,210,000 157,609 436,700
Village E 350 125 122,500 15,625 43,750
Village F 880 326 774,400 106,276 286,880
Village G 1,320 480 1,742,400 230,400 633,600
Village H 950 349 902,500 121,801 331,550
Village I 1,500 550 2,250,000 302,500 825,000
Village J 1,700 615 2,890,000 378,225 1,045,500
















e (x. -x) 2 = 222,392,
l l
2 SW 2
A 95% confidence range for e was selected. Therefore,
t =-t = 2.306
0.975 0.025
for eight degrees of freedom. Using equation (6),
A^W = -y = .0007 .
b £ (x.-x)
l
The suspected insurgent village to be used in this example is
the same as the one used in the first example. There, x' = 1300 and
y' = 510,000 pounds. Since W <0.1, approximations (7) and (8)
can be used and they yield z - 1440 and e . - 1366. Since
x 1 = 1300 is outside the 95% confidence interval for e , (1366, 1440),
then (66,140) represents a 95% confidence interval for the number of
insurgents near the suspected insurgent village. Similarly, 90%
confidence limits on e yield the interval (1373, 1433) and the 95%
confidence interval for the number of insurgents near the suspected
insurgent village is (73,133).
The foregoing examples were used to illustrate the application
of the model for estimating present insurgent strength. After a commodity
consumption variable is decided upon, in accordance with the necessary
assumptions, a confidence interval can be established for the population
from a suspected insurgent village. Comparison of the known popula-
tion with the interval of estimated population, for a particular confidence
level, can yield a range of values for the number of insurgents present
at the same confidence level. In order for this result to occur, the
known population has to be outside the interval of estimated population.
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In the first example, the supposed population, 1300, was within both
the 95% and 90% confidence intervals of the estimated population.
In the second example, 1300 people was less than the lower limit of
the interval of estimated population at both the 95% and 90% confidence
levels and definite statements about the presence of insurgents could
be made
.
These examples also indicate the effect of changing the number
of villages considered. The population and rice consumption of
Village A through Village D was the same in both examples. Adding six
more villages in the second example resulted in definite statements
about the presence of insurgents for both confidence levels.
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Generally, one would want the confidence interval for e to be
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An examination of the approximations (7) and (8) reveals that these
approximations are sensitive to changes in the difference between the
observed commodity consumption of a suspected insurgent village and
the mean commodity consumption of non-insurgent villages (y 1 -A),
the number of non-insurgent villages, and of course, the confidence
20
level. The effects of changes in (y' -A) and k will now be
discussed.
The size of selected non-insurgent villages can effect the size
of the confidence interval for e , By selecting non-insurgent villages
in such a way that their mean commodity consumption (A) is relatively
2
close to y' , the value of the expression (y 1 -A) will be small. As
2
the value of (y 1 -A) becomes smaller, the confidence interval of e
becomes smaller.
The number of villages to be considered (k) has a three-way effect
on what the length of the confidence interval for e will be. More
observations will result in the expression (1+ — ) being smaller, the
value of t will decrease as the degrees of freedom (k -2) becomes
larger, and the standard deviation (s) should decrease as the sample
size becomes larger. The length of the confidence interval changes
inversely with changes in k, as noted in the previous section where k
changed from four to ten.
In the sensitivity analysis above, it has been shown that the
size and number of non-insurgent villages selected and the confidence
level desired will have an effect on the size of the confidence interval
of e. Prior to performing computations to estimate the number of
insurgents in a village, the results of the sensitivity analysis should
be considered to assist in controlling the range of e .
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C. EXTENSION OF MODEL TO ESTIMATE OVERALL INSURGENT
STRENGTH
The examples in Section A were confined to estimations of
insurgent strength in individual villages. This limited analysis may-
be useful to a government desiring information about insurgent
strength for a particular village. Usually a government is more
interested in the overall strength of an insurgent force.
There are two methods which can be used to extend the model
to estimate overall insurgent strength. The confidence interval
obtained from these two methods depends on the number and size of
the non-insurgent villages which will be observed.
The first method would be to observe the population and commodity
consumption of a suspected insurgent area. If the area in which insur-
gents were thought to be present has a greater population than any of
the non-insurgent villages used to estimate the regression line, then
the value of commodity consumption for the entire insurgent area (y')
would be large in relation to the mean commodity consumption of non-
insurgent villages (A). From the sensitivity analysis in Section B, it
2
is known that a large value for the expression (y 1 - A) can result in
a large confidence interval for e. Since a large number of non-insurgent




-A) on the size of the confidence interval for e will be counter-
acted to some degree.
A second method also would consider the population and com-
modity consumption of a suspected insurgent area. Non-insurgent
22
villages would be grouped into areas approximately the same size as
the suspected insurgent area, if this is possible. The value of y'
and A would then be approximately equal so that the value of the
2
expression (y* -A) would be small. By grouping the observations
from non-insurgent villages, k would be reduced so the effect of a
2
small (y 1 -A) on the size of the confidence interval for e is counter-
acted by a small value of k.
If enough time and resources are available, both these methods
should be used and the smallest confidence interval for z should be
chosen. If time and resources are limited, the second method involves
fewer computations and should be used.
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III. MODELS FOR ESTIMATION OF FUTURE INSURGENT STRENGTH
In the preceding chapter, a model was developed to find
confidence intervals for the present number of insurgents in a country.
It is desired also to have procedures to estimate the number of insur-
gents at some future time. In the following paragraphs, some of the
more important factors causing change in insurgent strength will be
considered and their individual influences on overall insurgent strength
investigated.
Additions to the number of insurgents can occur from child births
7 ?
(within the insurgent community) and recruitments . An eighteen year
time lag probably exists before a child can be classified as a useful
insurgent. When a non-insurgent voluntarily becomes an insurgent,
a recruitment occurs. Insurgent propaganda and/or military operations
are usually the methods employed to solicit recruitments. Insurgents
are considered to be engaged in insurgency on a full-time basis, so
insurgent sympathizers and those people forced to provide help for the
insurgents through coercion are not considered insurgents.
Depletions to insurgent strength can occur from deaths in combat,
surrenders, deaths from disease, and retirements (old age). Deaths
in combat include insurgents who are captured and it is assumed that
these personnel will be immobilized for the duration of the conflict.
Surrenders include deserters. Insurgent deaths from disease usually
result from malnutrition, starvation, or infection. When an insurgent
24
is wounded in combat, escapes capture and later dies from his wound,
his death will be classified as a death from disease.
Each of the additions or depletions to insurgent strength, as
defined above, is a function of many variables. Two of the more
important of these variables appear to be government activity and insur-
gent activity. Analysis of insurgent recruitments, deaths in combat,
surrenders, and deaths from disease, as functions of government
activity and insurgent activity, will be attempted in this chapter.
Insurgent births and retirements, although functions of government
m
and insurgent activity, are probably affected, to a a greater degree, by
the age distribution of the insurgent population and the length of the
conflict. More births would be expected in a group of youthful insur-
gents and more retirements would be expected in a group of older insur-
gents . It would seem reasonable that the longer the conflict the more
consideration that should be afforded to births and retirements. For the
present analysis, however, it will be assumed that the collective impact
of births and retirements on future insurgent strength is negligible.
Generally, definitions of government activity in combating insur-
gency can fall into either of two categories; military or non-military.
Examples of definitions of military government activity levels could be
"government troop-days spent on patrol per month" and "the number of
tons of bombs dropped by the government per month." Examples of
definitions of non-military government activity levels could be "the
number of pounds of government literature disseminated to suspected
25
insurgent-occupied villages per month," "the number of inhabitants,
in an area where the presence of insurgents is suspected, treated by
mobile government medical units per month," and "the monthly value,
in local currency, of village and commodity support furnished by govern-
ment-sponsored activities in insurgent areas." Although any of these
definitions of government activity could be appropriate in analyzing
the distributions of additions and deletions to insurgent strength,
"government troop-days spent on patrol per month" has been chosen
as the index of government military activity to be used in this analysis.
Since an index of government military activity has been chosen,
it seems reasonable to also review insurgent activity in terms of its
military nature. The approach taken will be essentially speculative
and considerations of insurgent activity will be limited to the ends of
the spectrum of military activity: militarily passive and militarily
active. Communists in South Thailand have in recent years behaved as
militarily passive insurgents and Castro rebels in Cuba serve as a. past
example of the militarily active insurgents.
Data, consisting of the number of government troop-days spent
on patrol for monthly periods and the number of insurgent births ,
recruitments, deaths in military engagements, surrenders, deaths
from disease, and retirements for quarterly periods, would be needed
to determine the relationships among additions and deletions to insur-
gent strength and different levels of government activity. At this ,
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present time, this data does not appear to exist for the Thailand
example. In the absence of actual data, examples of possible
functional relationships between additions and deletions to insurgent
strength and government and insurgent activity will be hypothesized
and discussed. These examples form the rationale for later develop-
ment of a recursive model for estimating future insurgent strength.
A. INSURGENT RECRUITMENTS
A graph of insurgent recruitments as a function of government
activity for a militarily passive level of insurgent activity (I p ) and a
militarily active level of insurgent activity (I ) is shown in Figure 1.
The militarily passive insurgent (I ) curve will be considered first.
When government activity is low, insurgent propaganda concerning
government oppression probably has little impact on the populace but
as government activity is increased, there is evidence to support
claims of governmental oppression and recruitments increase. When
government activity is increased to the point that the insurgent propa-
ganda activities are seriously impaired, insurgent recruitments should
cease to increase and remain constant. If government activity is
further increased, the appeal of the insurgent cause should decrease
as a result of increased danger and recruitments probably will decrease.
As government activity is increased, it seems reasonable that
the engagements between government troops and militarily active insur-
gents should increase. Since the insurgents should be successful in









Insurgent Recruitments as a Function of Government Activity for
a Militarily Active Level of Insurgent Activity (1^) and a Militarily
Passive Level of Insurgent Activity (Ip)
Figure 1
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increase. A further increase in government activity could check the
insurgents success and recruitments would remain constant since
people are uncertain of the outcome of the conflict. Additional govern-
ment activity probably will relegate the insurgent to hit and run tactics
since he has to exercise more caution before engaging government
troops in combat. Interest and support of the insurgent should subside
at this level of government activity and recruitments should decrease.
B. INSURGENT DEATHS IN COMBAT
A graph of insurgent deaths in combat as a function of govern-
ment activity for two levels of insurgents activity is shown in Figure 2.
When insurgents are militarily passive, they will probably attempt to
avoid any confrontation with government troops . Deaths in combat for
militarily passive insurgents are those insurgent deaths which occur
in combat confrontations instigated solely by government troops. Since
this level of insurgent activity revolves around propaganda, increased
government activity probably will force the insurgents to become clan-
destine in their activities but the additional government patrolling
should result in more insurgent discoveries, captures, and deaths.
As government troop-days patrolling per month are increased,
engagements with militarily active insurgents should increase. As
engagements increase, insurgents probably will suffer increased deaths
in combat. The I curve has a steeper slope than the I curve since
















Insurgent Deaths in Combat as a Function of Government Activity
for a Militarily Active Level of Insurgent Activity (1^) and a




A graph of insurgents surrenders as a function of government
activity for the two extremes of insurgent activity is shown in Figure 3.
Militarily passive insurgents will concentrate on propaganda and
probably will attempt to avoid combat with the government. Usually,
they will not be as well-disciplined and dedicated to their cause as
militarily active insurgents, who probably are more concerned with
military training and who risk their lives in battle. Militarily active
insurgents should be more successful than militarily passive insurgents
in securing food at all levels of government activity since they are
probably more prone to use force in order to satisfy food needs. As a
conseguence of the above statements, government activity should
result in a larger number of surrenders from Ip than I. . However, for
both levels of insurgency, increases in government activity could impose
physical hardships through problems in logistics, exposure to elements,
and increased vigilance (loss of sleep). As these hardships and suffer-
ing increase, insurgent surrenders should increase.
D. INSURGENT DEATHS FROM DISEASE
A graph of insurgent deaths from disease as a function of govern-
ment activity for two levels of insurgent activity is shown in Figure 4.
Assuming insurgents are operating from a jungle or rural environment,
increases in government activity should cause insurgent exposure to
cuts, poor diet, starvation, fatigue, and wounds to increase. Insurgent












Insurgents Surrenders as a Function of Government Activity for a
Militarily Active Level of Insurgents Activity (1^) and a Militarily









Insurgent Deaths from Disease as a Function of Government
Activity for a Militarily Active Level of Insurgent Activity (1^)
and a Militarily Passive Level of Insurgent Activity (Ip)
Figure 4
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Therefore, increases in government activity should result in
increases in insurgent deaths from disease.
Militarily active insurgents will probably have a greater incidence
of combat wounds and thus should suffer more deaths from disease than
militarily passive insurgents. Accordingly, the I curve should be
above the I curve.
Since there is normally a token amount of government police
personnel assigned to areas of insurgency, a zero level of government
activity in the preceding graphs would be very unlikely. This should be
considered when looking at the graphs in Figure 1 through Figure 4.
For instance, it is possible that there could be some insurgent sur-
renders when there is no government activity.
E. SINGLE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY MODEL
Actual data for the additions and deletions to insurgent strength
and levels of government activity may be available for current emer-
gencies but there does not appear to be any evidence that this inform-
ation is being used to estimate future insurgent strength. After
appropriate reporting procedures are established for government mili-
tary agencies, records of government activity, measured in patrol
troop-days per month, insurgent surrenders per quarter, and insurgent
deaths in combat per quarter could be established and maintained.
Less precise records of insurgent recruitments and deaths from disease
could be established and maintained from information received from
government intelligence agencies.
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Once actual data is available, graphs can be plotted and
analyzed. The method suggested for construction of these graphs
requires estimated quarterly totals of insurgent recruitments, deaths
in combat, surrenders, and deaths from disease for the actual average
monthly government patrol troop-days during the same quarter. As an
example, assume actual insurgent surrenders during a particular quarter
were 100 and the actual monthly government patrol troop-days were
600, 840, and 72 0. Then a point (X,Y) on the graph of insurgent
surrenders would have the value (730, 100). If data for two years is
used, then each of the graphs of quarterly insurgent recruitments,
deaths in combat, surrenders, and deaths from disease, plotted against
average monthly government patrol troop-days , will have eight data
points. If continuity is assumed, a curve can be drawn through the
eight data points .
The model to estimate future insurgent strength is based on
these graphs. In order to have a dynamic model to accommodate and
reflect changes in insurgent and government tactics, the curves, des-
cribed above, would have to be updated by incorporating the most
recent quarterly observation and deleting the oldest quarterly observa-
tion. If the curves are constructed in this manner, they will be com-
prised of the most recent two years of observations .
Since government activity is a controlled variable and therefore
can be predicted approximately, the predicted average monthly govern-
ment patrol troop-days can be used to estimate quarterly additions and
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deletions to insurgent strength. By examining the graphs constructed
from past data, the intersection of the curve of insurgent deaths from
combat, for example, and the predicted average monthly level of
government activity will yield a predicted value for quarterly insurgent
deaths, in combat. As an example, assume that the curve in Figure 5
has been constructed by using past quarterly figures for insurgent
deaths in combat and average monthly government patrol troop-days.
If the average monthly level of government activity was predicted to
be 750 patrol troop-days for the next quarter, insurgent deaths in
combat would be estimated at 34 for the next quarter.
If the curves of insurgent recruitments, surrenders, and deaths
from disease are examined in the same manner for a predicted average
monthly level of government activity of 750 patrol troop-days, the
aggregate predicted addition or deletion to insurgent strength for next
quarter can be estimated.
In a protracted insurgency, insurgent births and retirements
could be included in the analysis. In a given situation, some inform-
ation probably would be available concerning the insurgent age distri-
bution and length of the conflict. If available, this information could
be used to estimate insurgent births and retirements.
When government resources are limited, a particular range of
future insurgent strength can be selected and the model can be used
in reverse to see what level of government activity would be needed to
contain the future numbers of insurgents within this range. At this
36
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Insurgent Deaths in Combat as a Function of Government Activity
Figure 5
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point, it should be reiterated that insurgent growth or decline is a
function of many things, of which government activity is assumed
predominant.
There are obvious arguments against the accuracy of estimates
provided by this model. Some of these arguments could be that the
assumption of continuity may not be valid for the areas of the curves
between the data points provided by past observations, that the
extreme ends ofthe curves are the product of questionable extrapolation,
and that the curves are not responsive enough to current changes in
tactics by either the government or the insurgents. All of these argu-
ments are valid but the information provided by this model should be
better than no information at all.
F. MULTIPLE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS MODEL
In the previous discussion, only one index of government activity
was used to estimate future insurgents strength. As was stated pre-
viously, various military and non-military government programs are
usually undertaken simultaneously in a counterinsurgency effort. In
this section, a model will be developed to relate the impact of multiple
government programs on future insurgent strength. First, a single
government program will be considered in the development of a model
and then the model will be expanded to include multiple government
programs .
The population is assumed to be divided into distinct groups of
insurgents and non-insurgents. Let p be the fraction of the total
K
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population which is insurgent at the beginning of time period k; then
the term (1 -p ) will be the fraction of the total population which is
K.
non-insurgent at the beginning of time period k.
Let G be the fraction of total population "reached" by any
K.
government program in time period k. The word "reached" is used to
denote exposure to any government program. An individual may be
"reached" by receiving a government leaflet or by receiving medical
attention which saves his life, so there is no distinction made between
the degree of government effort required to "reach" an individual. The
scope is the only characteristics of a government program represented
by G . Let n be the conditional probability that an insurgent is
"eliminated" if he is "reached." The word "eliminated" is used to
denote the removal of an insurgent from the insurgent population by
surrender or death or capture.
Let I be the fraction of non-insurgents "reached" by insurgents
in time period k. I is determined independently of any government
program. Let p be the conditional probability that a non-insurgent is
"converted" to insurgency if he is "reached." The word "converted"
is used to denote the migration of a non-insurgent from the non-insurgent
population to the insurgent population.
If it is assumed that the insurgents are randomly scattered
throughout the total population, the expression p G is the fraction
of population which is insurgent and "reached" by the government in
time k. The term p G n is the fraction of population which is
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insurgent, "reached" by the government, and "eliminated" by the
government during time period k. The term (1 -p, ) I, is the fraction
K k
of population which is non-insurgent and "reached" by the insurgents
in time period k. The expression (1-p ) I p is the fraction ofK K
population which is non-insurgent, "reached" by the insurgents, and
"converted" to insurgency during time period k.
bet p be the fraction of the total population which is insur-
gent at the beginning of time period (k + 1) . Then p, , will be equalk +- 1
to p, minus the fraction of insurgents "eliminated" plus the fraction
k
of non-insurgents "converted" during time period k. This relationship
can be expressed as follows:
p
k + l





In (9), n reflects government efficiency in "eliminating" insur-
gents and P reflects insurgent efficiency in "converting" non-insurgents.
Since government activity not only results in fractions of the population
being "reached" by the government but has some effect on fractions of
the population "reached" by the insurgents, n and p might be con-
sidered as functions of G . Assuming that n and are linear
functions of G, , they could have the forms ( n + 3 G, ) and
k o l k
( p + 3 G, ) respectively. In this context n would represent theo ^ k o
probability that an insurgent is eliminated when no insurgents are
reached by government. The term p represents the fraction of non-
insurgents converted to insurgency in period k if reached by the insur-
gents when no government programs exist. The terms B-^ and 62 represent
the program efficiency slopes.
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If an extreme government program requires armed pursuit and
ultimate capture of insurgents, it should be successful in the sense
that insurgents will be eliminated but the effects of such a program
on non-insurgents may contribute to their successful recruitments by-
insurgents. Conversely, a government good-will program which is
directed toward the entire population in the hope of winning over
insurgents peacefully may not be very successful in eliminating mili-
tant insurgents but may serve to greatly hamper insurgent recruitments.
It is assumed that if government efficiency in removing insur-
gents ( n) increases with the slope (G ) of a program, then insurgents
K.
recruiting efficiency ( p) will be reduced equally. Therefore, in this
analysis, the slopes of the lines ( n + 3-^G ) and (p + 3 2 G )
will be equal in value but will have opposite signs, i.e.
, 6, will be
equal to -3 . Now (9) can be restated as
p
k + i
= pk- pk G k ( % +B S'^-'W^- 6 ^- do)
It is noted that (10) is a quadratic equation in G and represents
a recursive relationship for the fraction insurgent, of the population.
The term p, G. (n_ + 6 G, ) represents the fraction of insurgents
k k ° k
"eliminated" by the government during time period k. The term
(1 -p ) I ( P - B G ) is a cross product of I and G and represents
the fraction of non-insurgents "converted" to insurgents. This term
reflects the effects of government programs on insurgent recruiting
efficiency.
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A government will usually have many programs that have insur-
gent "elimination" as their ultimate goal. Some examples of military
and non-military government activity were given at the beginning of
this chapter. Any or all of these government programs can be utilized
in a particular time period and it would be desirable to modify the
recursion of (9) to reflect the effects of simultaneous but different
government programs
.
Let G be the fraction of total population "reached" by the
i government program during time period k and n be the condi-
tional probability that an insurgent is eliminated if he is "reached"
by the i government program. The term p, G, n is the fraction
k k
of population which is insurgent, "reached" by government program i,
and "eliminated" by government program i during the time period k.
If all programs were mutually exclusive in their scope, equation (9)
could be modified to include all government programs by summing the
second term of (9) over all i programs. However, it seems reasonable
that some insurgents may be "reached" by more than one government
program. For example, if an insurgent was exposed to two programs,
the probability of his elimination would be greater than it would have
been if he was "reached" by just one of the programs. These inter-
actions will be considered below.
The term (1 -p G n ) is the fraction of population which is
K K
not (1) insurgent, (2) "reached" by government program i, and
(3) "eliminated" by government program i during time period k. The
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product tt (1 -p G n ) is the fraction of population which is not
K K
(1) insurgent, (2) "reached" by any government programs , and
(3) "eliminated" by any programs in time period k. Therefore, the
term 0. - t (1-p, G, n ) 1 is the fraction of population which is
k k
insurgent, "reached," and "eliminated" for all of the government
i i
programs during time period k. After substituting n + 3 G for
n in the last expression, it becomes
[ 1 - tt { 1 - p G
1
( n + e'G,
1
) } ] .
k k o k
This expression replaces the second term on the right hand side
of (10) when multiple government programs exist.
The third term on the right hand side of (10) ,
[ (1-Pk ) Ik (Po- 6 Gk )]
measured the effect of a government program on recruitment of non-
insurgents by insurgents. The term p was defined as the probability
that a non-insurgent is "converted" to insurgency if he is "reached"
by the insurgents when there are no government programs. The effects
of any government program on insurgent recruitments would probably
not be instantaneous and will be assumed to lag one time period.
Therefore, insurgent recruiting efficiency will be affected by govern-
ment programs in time period (k - 1) . The effect of any government
program on insurgent recruitments was assumed to be - 3G and the
effect of all government programs on insurgent recruitments is
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and the term in brackets is the fraction of the population reached by








- I [i- , (i-^.iM n
will replace the third term on the right hand side of (10) when
multiple government programs exist.
Replacing the last two terms of (10) by the expressions which
were developed to recognize multiple government programs, the ;
expression for the fraction of the total population that is insurgent at
the end of time period k becomes
Pk+1
= Pk-^- * ^" Pk G k ( ^o + ^K ] >1
(11)
+ (1 " pk
)r
k
CV 6 ' { l ~ * (1 - Gk-i )}] • •
As an example of the computation of p will be given, it is assumed
that three government programs are in existence during time periods
(k - 1) and k. The first program is a military one which requires
searching of homes and villages for insurgents. The second program
is non-military and requires government propaganda leaflets to be
-»
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distributed to villages by air. The third program is also non-military
and involves sending medical assistance teams to villages to treat
disease
.
Hypothetical data for the three programs is presented in
Table III. The fraction of the population "reached" by the first pro-
gram is observed to be about 1/25 in time period (k - 1) and is estimated
to increase to 1/20 in time period k. The fraction of the population
"reached" by the second program is observed to be about 1/4 in time
period k. The fraction of the population "reached" by the third pro-
gram is observed to be about 1/8 in time period (k - 1) and is estimated
Table III
Data for Three Government Programs
Program One Program Two Program Three
Scope of Program i
during time period k 1/20 1/4 1/10
Scope of Program i
during time period k-1 1/25 1/4 1/8
Program efficiency
slope during any -3/4 1/10 1/4
time period
to decrease to 1/10 in time period k. Program efficiencies slopes for
any time period are estimated to be -3/4, 1/10, and 1/4 for the first,
second, and third programs respectively. The fraction of population
which is insurgent at the beginning of time period k (p ) is estimated
to be 1/10. The fraction of non-insurgents "reached" by the insurgents
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during time period k (I ) is estimated to be 1/5 . When no government
programs exist, the elimination efficiency ( n ) and recruiting effi-
ciency ( p Q ) are both estimated to be 1/8. When these values are
substituted into equation (11),
1 3 4 51
"k+1 10 500 500 500
When using equation (11)
, p , the fraction of the total popula-
tion which is presently insurgent could be estimated by the model in
Chapter II. The G, expressions should not be difficult to estimate
k
since the fraction of the population reached by a program may, in
most cases, be reasonably well-estimated. The estimation of the i
program efficiency slope ( 6 ) , the elimination efficiency when no
government programs exist (n ) , the recruiting efficiency when no
government programs exist ( p ), and the fraction of non-insurgents
"reached" by the insurgents during time period k (I ) will be more
difficult but should be feasible.
The single government activity model was very sensitive to the
validity of the assumption that continuous curves of additions and
deletions to insurgent strength could be drawn for various levels of
a single index of government activity. The multiple government pro-
grams model considers the effect of all government programs on insur-
gent elimination and recruitments. It offers an alternative when the
use of the single government activity model might be inappropriate.
After examining a particular insurgent scenario, the more appropriate
model for estimating insurgent strength should be chosen.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the preceding chapters models for estimating present and
future strength have been presented. The model for estimating present
insurgent strength should be an improvement on guesswork. It should
be applicable in most areas of the world if the commodity selected
is a staple item in the local diet. It is possible that commodity con-
sumption data for insurgent or non-insurgent villages may be affected
by the age and sex mix of the corresponding populations. By weighting
age and sex to modify population data, it should be possible to pre-
serve linearity between population and commodity consumption.
Future application of the model for estimating present insurgent
strength in an actual insurgency situation would be desirable, since
the utility of the model could be tested. If actual figures for popula-
tions and applicable commodity consumption are available and the
necessary assumptions are fulfilled, a confidence interval for present
insurgent strength could be found.
Since force ratios are usually a consideration in planning the
number of government troops to meet an insurgent threat, knowledge
of estimated insurgent strength would assist in determining this number.
As an example, if a ten-to-one force ratio of government troops to
insurgent is desired and a 95% confidence interval for insurgent strength
is (875 , 935) , the number of government troops assigned to cope with
insurgents should be in the interval (8750,9 350).
47
The first model for estimating future insurgent strength, the
single government activity model, requires historical data concerning
insurgent additions and deletions for levels of a particular government
activity. It has been suggested that two years of data would be suffi-
cient. It is a dynamic model in the sense that the most current data
replaces the oldest data. If a range of values for average monthly
government activity exists , continuous curves of insurgent additions
and eliminations as functions of a government activity can be drawn.
If the continuity assumption could be satisfied and minimum
extrapolation performed, this model should provide reasonable pre-
dictions. An area of future work could be using the model for estimating
future insurgent strength and evaluating its predictions. This could be
done using data which is available from a past insurgency or amassing
relevant data from a current insurgency.
The second model for estimating future insurgent strength, the
multiple government program model, uses G , the fraction of the popul-
ation reached by the government in time period k, as a decision variable
The effects of all programs rather than a single program are considered
in order to estimate insurgent eliminations and recruitments. This
model requires the observations of the fraction of the population reached
by government program i (G ) from the preceding period and estimates
of G for the current period. In this respect, the multiple government
program model can be useful alternative for the single government acti-
vity model when two years of historical data are not available.
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It was noted that the multiple government programs model was
recursive. Therefore, by n repeated applications of the recursive
relationship, the fraction of population which is insurgent at the
beginning of time period k + n (p, . could be estimated. In this
k + n)
context, this model could be used as a planning tool for estimating
the effectiveness of an overall government programs effort.
Future work could be done in some of the areas covered in this
thesis. In the model for estimating present insurgent strength, a
linear relationship was assumed to exist between population and com-
modity consumption. It was suggested that some type of food be
selected as the commodity to be measured. Future investigation could
uncover a better commodity than food to use in this type of model.
Possible substitutes might be medical supplies or gasoline.
In this single government activity model, the selection of a good
index of government activity is necessary. This index should be one
for which functional relationships exist with additions and deletions to
insurgent strength. Several possibilities may have to be considered
before discovering a satisfactory index.
In the multiple government program model, the slopes of the lines
( n + 3 , G, ) and ( p 4- 3 9 G ) were assumed to be equal in value
but had opposite signs. When government efficiency in removing insur-
gents (n) is increasing with the scope (G ) of a program, then the
K
effects of this program on insurgent recruiting efficiency ( p) should be
examined. Insurgent recruiting efficiency ( p) should be reduced by
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the same amount that n is increased. By this type of investigation,
the validity of the assumption 6 = - 8 could be established.
It is hoped that the discussion, observations, and modeling
techniques contained in this thesis will benefit future counterinsurgency
analysis. Although the problem of quantifying and dealing with the
many variables inherent to counterinsurgency analysis has by no means
been completely solved, it is felt that a start has been made.
50
APPENDIX A
In this appendix, a model to estimate linear regression is
developed and extended to find intervals for e , the true value of x,
for any confidence level. In this thesis, x represents the known
population of a village from the census and e represents the population
of villages based on commodity consumption. The objective of the
method is to find a confidence interval for the difference between e
and x.
Assume y is distributed normally about an expected value 6
2
with variance a and all observations are independent. The number
of observations is defined as k. Assume that
9 = a + 6 (x-x)
, (12)
4 2
a simple linear function of x. Sample estimates A, b, and S of
2
o
, 3 , and a , are desired as well as the distributions of these
estimates. The estimated regression equation is







The method of least squares can be used to estimate regression.
This method uses those values of A and b which will minimize the sum
4
Brownlee, K. A. , Statistical Theory and Methodology in Science
and Engineering
, p. 274, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1960.
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of squares of deviations (SSD) , between observed values y, and the
predictions Y. given by putting values of x. in (13). Therefore, it
is desired to minimize
SSD = E (Y^Y.) 2 = E [y.-A-b (x.-x)] 2 . ' (14)
The following relationships result when (14) is differentiated with





-2 i [y.-A-b (x.-x)] = ' (15)
and
^|^-=-2 E[y.-A-b (x.-x) ](x.-x) = 0. (16)d b ill
After rearranging terms and using the fact that E (x. -x) = 0, the
















Since E (x. -x) = and therefore y £(x. -x) = 0, the numerator of
the right hand side of (18) becomes
E (x.-x) y. -y E (x. -x) = E (x, -x) (y. -y ) ,.
and an alternative way of expressing b is
E(x. -x) (y. -y)






Since (17) and (18) show that A and b are linear functions of
the y. which are assumed to be independent and have a normal distri-
2
bution, with variance a , the expected values and the variances of
A and b are
y
i 1
E [ A ] = l E [— ] = - e [ a + e (x -x) ] = a .., (20)
z(x. -x) E [y.] Z(x.-x) [a + 6 (x. -x) ]
E [ b ] = L = (21)













V [A]= V[-y~]= -
2




E(x. _x) y. i (x. -x) 2
V Cbl = VE ^ ^-] = *
2







The deviation of an observation y. from the value predicted by
(12) can be written as
y. - 6. = (y.-Y.) + (Y.- 6.) (24)
l l li li
= (y. -Y.) + [A+b (x. -x) - {a+ 3 (x. -x) }]li l l
= (y.-Y.) + (A- a) + (b- 6 ) (x.-x) .
l l l
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+ k (a - a )
2
+ (b-e ) z (x. -x) 2 (25)
1 °i 1 1 1
since the various cross products are zero.
2
In equation (25), £ (y. - 6 .) is a sum of squares with k
2 2
degrees of freedom and is distributed as o x (k). It consists of
three parts. The parts involving A and b have one degree of freedom
2
each. The third part, Z (Yi~Yi) / involves k variables but by
setting equations (15) and (16) equal to zero, the degrees of freedom
become (k - 2)
.
Since the sum of squares on the left hand side of (25) equals the
sum of the three sums of squares on the right hand side of (25) and the
degrees of freedom of both sides of (25) are equal, the sums of squares
2 2
on the right hand side are independent and are distributed as o x
w ith degrees of freedom (k - 2) , 1, and 1, respectively. Since
2 2 2 2










] = E [ ±—±- ] = — EC X (k-2) ]= a (26)
k - 2 k-2
2 2
•
Therefore S is an estimator of o and is independent of A and b.
The deviation of y. from the mean y can be written as
(y.-y) = (y^YJ + (Y.-y) (27)
After squaring (2 7) and summing over i,
z(y.-9)
2
= £ (y^YJ 2 + I (Y.-y) 2 (28)
where
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2E(Y.-y) 2 = I CA + b (x. -x) - A ] =b 2 Z(x.-x) 2 (29)
The sum of the cross products is zero since that sum is in the form of
2
equation (16). The left hand side of (28), E (y. -y) , is the sum of
squares of deviations of observations from the mean, with (k - 1)
2
degrees of freedom. On the right hand side of (28), l (y -Y ) is the
l i
sum of squares of deviations of observed values from the estimated
line. In (26) , it was shown the expected value of the mean square
2 2 2
1 (y.-Y.) /(k-2) was a . The second term Z (Y. -y) has 1
degree of freedom. Since the sum of squares on the left hand side of
(2 8) equals the sum of two sums of squares on the right hand side of
(28) and the degrees of freedom of both sides of (28) are equal, the
sums of squares on the right side are independent and are distributed
2 2
as ° X with degrees of freedom (k-2) and 1 respectively, as shown
in Table IV.
Table IV
Analysis of Variance Table for Deviations from the Mean
Source of Variance Degrees of Freedom Sum of Squares
Slope of line 1 Z (Y. -y)
2











If a new observation y' is given and it is desired to find con-
fidence limits for the predicted x corresponding to this y 1 , the
estimated regression equation (13) will have to be solved in reverse
to obtain
bx = bx + Y-A (30)
Replacing x by x and y' in (30), yields
x = x + — (31)
a point estimate of the value x corresponding to the new observation y'
.
The expected value of y' is e . Corresponding to this value of ,0 is
a value of x given by solving the true regression equation (13) for x.
Calling this value of x, e, then
- a . .
e = x + (32)
or
n
0-a" B ( e - x) = (33)
Now a new variable z is defined such that
z = y' -A-b(e-x) . (34)
Using the results of (20), (21), and (33), the expected value of z is
E[z]= E[y'] - E IX ] - ( £ - x) E £ b J (35)





Using the results of (22) and (23), the variance of z is





+ IT + ( e " x) Z&c.-x) 2
1
2 n 1 ( e- x)
2
-.
a [1 + - + -1 L 9 ]k E(x.-x) Z
l
The random variable z is a linear function of three random normally
distributed variables y' , A, and b and therefore is normally distributed
z -




replace a by its estimate S in (36) and using the relationship in
(34),
y' - A - b (e - x)
i ; rd - t(k-2). (37)
sj i + l + ^ - x ) 2
k E(x. -x) 2
In order to derive confidence limits for z, (37) can be inserted




Assuming e is the lower confidence limit, then





t n , (38)
(e -x)
^ (x. -x) 2
where t is the P 2 point of t with the same degrees of freedom as
S, (k-2).
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It is desired to have equation (38) in the form of a quadratic
equation in e Both sides of equation (38) are squared and the
results are expanded
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The solutions for a quadratic equation in the form











2 A. - 2A 2A - ^ A 2
In this case
b - ?.( r
t
?
2s2;/^i- ;)2 ]- b25£ - b(y, - A) i
2A "
r , 2 2 2 , „ , -,2
2 [ b - t S / E (x.-x) ]
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rK 2 *2 S
2
i 2 2 *2
S ' (Y " A)2
z(x.-x) Z K Z Z(x.-x)
i i
The second term of (41) is














-x) Z l i
l
When the results of (42) and (44) are substituted in (41) and the











-V / 2 t 2 S 2 2
b 2 2 S 2 /E(
-2
J * "^ ] (l +i+ fr'"*> a )
-t
rt / Mx.-x) v v / -v2 k v/ -^
2 i Z (x. -x) E(x. -x)
Similarly, the upper confidence limit e can be obtained using t, in
place of t
?
and its solution is the same as (45) with this change.



























(1 -W) - b . (47)
^ (x. -x) Z
After substituting the approximation from (47) into (45), the approxi-
mate confidence limits for e are
2 2
, ~ x +
yl
' A *2 S / 1 W -A) 2
1









Now, given a new observation y 1 , W is computed and if it is
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